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COMMENTS
them under the Jones Act would necessarily to a large extent concern
itself with the absence of them.
This is true because the Jones Act obviated some defenses existing prior
to the enactment. Assumption of risk under the Jones Act is not a defense,
though it was before the Act.9 The same is true of contributory negli-
gence, since under the Act, the doctrine of comparative negligence is
followed. 97
Failure to begin an action within the proscribed three-year period is held
to extinguish the cause of action under the Jones Act and hence is an abso-
lute defense by an employer.98 An employer may also plead a release that
is validly executed by a seamanY9
CONCLUSION
It should be apparent at this point that the Jones Act is not a clear succinct
statement of the law. Attesting to this fact is the mass of litigation con-
cerned to a large extent with ascertaining Congressional intent behind the
words of the Act. Certain principles do emerge, however, from this body
of interpretation, which comprise the law of the Act and which this writer
has enumerated.
The purpose of the Jones Act is to extend the rights of the seamen. This
is evidenced by the addition to his rights of an action for negligence, his
right to a jury trial for this action, a right of recovery for wrongful death
and more. Defenses which would bar this action were abolished. Congress
has acted to help the seaman and the courts have complemented this Act by
their decisions. It can well be said that seamen are the wards of admiralty.
96 E.g., The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
97 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U.S. 110 (1936).
98 E.g., Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926).
99 Sitchon v. American Export Lines, 113 F.2d 830 (C.A. 2d, 1940); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co, 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
DEVELOPMENTS IN "RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL" CASES
At what point in a criminal proceeding does an accused have the right to
counsel? A theory more liberal than any heretofore promulgated is found
in the concurring opinions of a recent Supreme Court decision. The case
with the new answer is Spano v. People.' In Spano the petitioner, under
indictment for murder, was subjected to a long period of police grilling.
During this interrogation he refused to make a statement, but repeatedly
asked to. see his counsel. All requests for counsel were denied. Through
1360 U.S. 315 (1959).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
use of chicanery, a confession was finally elicited from Spano and admitted
into evidence at the trial which resulted in his conviction. On certiorari,
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
confession violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution under "traditional principles."
In reversing under "traditional principles," five of the Justices were
apparently saying that the confession was involuntary by reason of the
methods used to obtain it. While this case might therefore seem to be a
reassertion of settled principles of law, the clues to the important new
development in the concept of due process in general, and the right to
-counsel in particular, are manifest in the two concurring opinions. Emphasis
in those opinions was placed upon the absence of counsel at the time the
confession was obtained. Four of the Justices joined in pointing out that
the denial of counsel alone, to one who has been indicted, during the period
of police interrogation, is sufficient to make a confession inadmissible under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
The history of attempts to solve the enigma "when is an individual en-
titled to counsel?" may be traced in a progression of Supreme Court deci-
sions dating back to 1932 and Powell v. Alabama,3 the case heavily relied
upon by the concurring judges in Spano. In this "landmark" 4 case, the
defendants were Negro boys charged with the rape of two white girls.
The judge, at arraignment, designated "all the members of the bar" 5 as
counsel for the defendants. Defendants were never consulted as to whether
they desired to hire counsel or to have the court appoint counsel for them.
Their trials (they were tried in several groups at the state's request for
severance) resulted in conviction and death sentences for all.
2 The two concurring opinions seem to have taken exactly the same position, differ-
ing only in manner of presentation. In the first opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas was
joined by Justices Black and Brennan. Douglas' stand was that a defendant is entitled to
counsel immediately after indictment, before trial. Spano v. People, 360 U.S. 315, 324
(1959). The second concurrence, by Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas
and Brennan, in effect stated the same theory as the first. Justice Stewart declared that
although arraignment and trial should follow an indictment, in Spano the indictment
was followed by a police interrogation. He also pointed out that an accused has a right
to counsel in the proceedings (i.e., indictment, arraignment and trial) in a capital case,
and that he has an unqualified right to counsel whom he has retained, in any case.
Stewart concluded that since the law requires that one on trial in a capital case be al-
lowed counsel in a public court, it should do the same for him during a closed police
interrogation. Since Stewart emphasized the fact that the Spano case dealt with the
questioning, not of a suspect, but of one who had been indicted, it can be inferred that
he, too, was declaring that counsel must be allowed at every point following indictment.
Spano v. People, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959).
a 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4Justice Black designates Powell v. Alabama as "one of [the] landmark decisions" of
the Supreme Court, in his dissenting opinion in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 338 and
338 n. 3 (1957).
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
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In reviewing the convictions, the United States Supreme Court objected
to the fact that until the day of the trial the responsibility for the defense
of the boys could not be attributed to any one attorney. The Court felt
that the judge's general appointment of all members of the bar in order
to arraign defendants, and his expectation that they would continue to act
for the defendants if no attorney of their own appeared, did not accord
the boys sufficient representation. The Court further believed that even
if the trial judge had made his appointment not only for arraignment, but
for the whole proceeding, none of the lawyers who made up "the bar"
would have felt "that individual sense of duty" which comes from the
naming of a particular attorney as counsel for the defense.
After demonstrating that the defendants did not have proper representa-
tion, the Powell Court made a statement that is especially relevant to the
problem of when the right to counsel becomes constitutionally mandatory.
The Court stated:
During perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these
defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning
of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation
were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any
real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period
as at the trial itself.7
This statement is important for the reason that it gives us some definite
pronouncement as to the time when counsel must be allowed, i.e., from
arraignment forward. But it is especially significant for the reason that Mr.
Justice Douglas, in writing one of the two concurring opinions in the
Spano case, quotes these very words and concludes from them that to
deny counsel to one "formally charged with a crime"8 before trial would
be perhaps more serious than to do so during trial. Thus, Justice Douglas
would go further and require counsel not after arraignment, but after
indictment.
In 1940 the Supreme Court decided another case which had something
to say about the time element in the right to counsel question. In Avery v.
Alabama,9 at the time defendant was arraigned on the charge of the murder
of his wife, two attorneys were appointed to defend him. The case was
called to trial three days later, at which time the attorneys moved for a
continuance on the ground that they had not had time to formulate their
defense because of other trial work. From the record it would appear
that no ruling was given on the motion, but in any event, the case pro-
6 Ibid, at 56.
7 Ibid., at 57 (emphasis supplied).
8 Spano v. People, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (emphasis supplied).
9 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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ceeded to trial the same day. The jury found defendant guilty and pre-
scribed the death penalty. In affirming the judgments of the lower courts,
the Supreme Court seemed to set up a criterion of determination less liberal
than Powell's "from the time of arraignment" standard. Specifically, the
Avery court said that the Constitution does not set out any length of time
between the point when counsel must be appointed and the trial is to be
had, and that therefore the mere denial of the continuance did not con-
travene due process. It was also stated, in effect, however, that the refusal
of the continuance could have been an unconstitutional denial of legal
assistance. The measure used in Avery to judge whether the right to
counsel had been sufficiently enjoyed was the "facts and circumstances"
standard. The Court pointed out, for example, that "under the particular
circumstances"' 10 of the case before them, there was no deprivation of coun-
sel. One of the facts and circumstances noted was the fact that the trial
was had during "Court Week."" The Court seemed to feel that since
during "Court Week" witnesses and other persons with knowledge of
events and occurrences in the county all congregated at the county seat,
the attorneys had sufficient opportunity to conduct their investigation.12
Another consideration of the Court was the zeal of the two attorneys in
fighting the case, and carrying it all the way to the Supreme Court.1
It should be noted that while Avery v. Alabama does establish the "facts
and circumstances" test, it does not run in direct opposition to Powell v.
A labama, for it cites Powell as authority for the statement that the appoint-
ment of counsel without affording such counsel the time to prepare could
be "nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's require-
ment that an accused be given the assistance of counsel."' 4
A year after Avery v. Alabama (in 1941), another "facts and circum-
stances" decision was rendered in Lisenba v. California.5 In that case,
defendant was picked up on an incest charge and questioned concerning
the murder of his wife; he was not allowed to see his counsel till formally
arrested on the incest charge. Eleven days after arraignment for the crime
10 Ibid., at 450.
11The Court gave the following explanation concerning "Court Week": "The
offense for which petitioner was convicted occurred in a County largely rural. The
County seat, where court was held, has a population of less than a thousand. Indict-
ments in the Bibb County Circuit Court, as in most rural Counties throughout the Na-
tion, are most frequently returned and trials had during fixed terms or sessions of
court. And these rural 'Court Weeks' traditionally bring grand and petit jurors, wit-
nesses, interested persons and spectators from every part of the County into the County
seat for court." Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,450 to 452 (1940).
12 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.. at 446. 15 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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of incest, defendant was taken from the jail where he had been incarcerated
and questioned again, without counsel. The Court noted various things in
its opinion, among which were the defendant's intelligence, experience in
the business world, and calm manner; in view of these and other circum-
stances, it declared that the sustained questionings in the absence of coun-
sel did not make defendant's confessions involuntary and therefore a vio-
lation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. It should be
observed that the questionings took place prior to any indictment on the
murder charge. Technically, up to that point, defendant had been pro-
ceeded against on the incest charge.
The next case, that of Hawk v. Olson,16 was a 1945 decision. It might
seem that this case, on its face, says the same thing as the concurring Jus-
tices in Spano in regard to the point at which counsel must be allowed.
However, Hawk does not go as far as the Spano concurring opinions. In
Hawk v. Olson petitioner had had a preliminary hearing on a murder
charge; he was subsequently brought before the court and arraigned, when
an information charging him with the murder was read to him. He pleaded
not guilty and asked for a continuance so that he could, among other things,
seek advice of counsel. The request was denied and a Public Defender and
his assistant took over petitioner's case without his prior consent, and with-
out having been appointed by the court. Petitioner claimed that he did not
consult with these attorneys after their self-appointment. The Hawk
opinion stated: "We think there was an allegation that no effective assist-
ance of counsel was furnished in the critical time between the plea of not
guilty and the calling of the jury."17 This would seem to be the old Powell
"after arraignment" standard. The theory that it is the Powell criterion is
substantiated by the very next statement of the Court that whether or not
a continuance would have helped petitioner, "the importance of the assist-
ance of counsel in a serious criminal charge after arraignment is too large
to permit speculation on its effect."1 8 The Court also made a statement
that might appear to be identical with the holding of the Spano concurring
opinions: "We hold that denial of opportunity to consult with counsel on
any material step after indictment or similar charge and arraignment vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment."1 Upon examining the sentence, how-
ever, it is seen that the holding is not that counsel must be permitted after
indictment, but after indictment and arraignment, which is just the standard
of the Powell case.
In 1946, Canizio v. New York 20 seemed to swing the pendulum back to
the "facts and circumstances" idea of Avery v. Alabmna-at least as far as
16 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
17 Ibid., at 278 (emphasis supplied). 19 Ibid., at 278 (emphasis supplied).
18 Ibid., at 278 (emphasis supplied). 20 327 U.S. 82 (1946).
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the majority opinion is concerned. Canizio, as opposed to Spano and all
other decisions above reviewed, was a non-capital case; this probably should
be noted in light of the fact that in 1942 Betts v. Brady2' had held that the
defendant in a non-capital criminal case is not entitled to counsel as a mat-
ter of right. In Canizio v. New York petitioner had been arraigned and
had pleaded guilty to a robbery charge without having had benefit of coun-
sel. Petitioner did not deny, however, that a notice of appearance of counsel
for him was filed two days before sentencing; this, together with the
record of the original proceedings, showed, according to the Court, that
Canizio had been "actively represented . . . in long hearings during the
day of sentence." 22 They therefore held that under the circumstances the
right to counsel had been sufficiently provided for. The dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Murphy, however, put forth the standard that counsel must
be allowed "at each and every step in a criminal proceeding." 23 Though
unfortunately Justice Murphy did not define "each and every step of the
criminal proceeding," it would seem that his dissent predicted develop-
ments along the lines of the Spano concurrences.
A capital case decided the same year as Canizio was peculiar in its facts.
In Carter v. Illinois24 petitioner was a thirty-year-old Negro without for-
real schooling, and although he had pleaded guilty to the murder charge
and waived his right to counsel, it would appear that he had not done so
with full realization of the consequences. The Court declared, however,
that they were limited to the record before them, and the record contained
no facts concerning petitioner's limitations. They decided that they could
only consider any such disabilities when put in issue before them. The
Court did make mention of a means, however, for determining when coun-
sel is mandatory. This method would appear to be a kind of hybrid of the
"facts and circumstances" and "after arraignment" ideas:
Under pertinent circumstances, the opportunity [to meet an accusation] is
ample only when an accused has the assistance of counsel for his defense. And
the need for such assistance may exist at every stage of the prosecution, from
arraignment to sentencing.2 5
Reece v. Georgia,26 decided in 1955, is another case which might be
interpreted as going further than the concurring Justices in Spano. Upon
close scrutiny, though, it would seem to be more a decision in a particular
case under particular facts and circumstances. Reece,, a Negro, had been
arrested, indicted, and convicted of rape. He was not afforded counsel
until one day after his indictment. Reece claimed that Negroes had been
systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, but under
21316 U.S. 455 (1942). 24 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
.2 Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 (1946). 25 Ibid., at 174 (emphasis supplied).
23 Ibid., at 89. 26 350 US. 85 (1955).
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a Georgia rule of practice, objection to the grand jury must be raised
before indictment. Although the Court could not say, under the circum-
stances, whether with the aid of an attorney Reece would have been able
to make his objection during the time he was in jail, before indictment
was handed down, they did say (having taken notice both of his lack
of education and mental capacity) that it was "utterly unrealistic to say
that he had such opportunity when counsel was not provided for him
until the day after he was indicted.'' 27 The Court then relied upon Powell
to support its decision, quoting that part of the opinion which says that
mere appointment of counsel does not satisfy due process if done "at such
time and under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid in the preparation and trial of a capital case .... ,28 Although it would
seem that Reece holds that a defendant has a right to counsel before
indictment, which would be a more liberal rule than that in Spano, in
actuality it makes no objective declaration that all defendants are entitled
to counsel before indictment, but merely says that under these particular
facts and circumstances this particular defendant was unconditionally
denied an attorney-at-law. Perhaps the case is significant for another reason.
It did not adopt the touchstone in Powell that a defendant is entitled to
counsel from arraignment; instead it took a statement from the Powell
case and indicated that there were possibilities for the generation of an
even more liberal interpretation of when advice of counsel becomes an
undeniable right.
Was Reece v. Georgia auguring some expansion of Powell v. Alabama?
Some indication to this effect appeared in a dissent in the 1957 case of
In re Groban.2 9 The Groban majority decided that a witness being inter-
rogated in an investigation by the state fire marshal had no right to counsel.
One of the concurring Justices in Spano v. New York took special pains
to distinguish the Groban case on the basis that it involved witnesses in
an administrative hearing rather than one charged with a capital case as
in Spano, therefore making it plain that the Groban opinion would not
control. Although Groban does not control, the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Black8 ° is worthy of note for the declaration that it makes
concerning when counsel becomes a matter of right:
I ... firmly believe that the Due Process Clause requires that a person inter-
rogated be allowed to use legal counsel whenever he is compelled to give testi-
27 Ibid., at 89, 90 (emphasis supplied).
28 Ibid., at 90.
29352 US. 330 (1957).
80 Spano v. People, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). It might be well to remember at this point
that Justice Black joined in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion on the matter of right
to counsel.
81 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957).
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mony to law-enforcement officers which may be instrumental in his prosecution
and conviction for a criminal offense.81
Justice Black states further that "this Court has repeatedly held that an
accused in a state criminal prosecution has an unqualified right to make
use of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him,' 8 2 seemingly
indicating that it is a foregone conclusion that every person is entitled to
legal advice during grilling in a state criminal case.
Two cases which were reviewed in 1958 raised the problematic point
of when counsel must be permitted. Both involved the interrogation of
suspects in murder cases, and the majority of the Court held in both cases
that the suspects were not entitled to counsel during the period of ques-
tioning.3 Both concurring opinions in Spano pointed out, however, that
Spano was not a mere suspect, but had been indicted. Although the cases
as thus distinguished may not be precisely in point, what they.said deserves
mention.
One of the two 1958 decisions is Cicenia v. Lagay,3 4 which took the
position uttered in the Avery case that there was no absolute right to
counsel during questioning, but rather when the right would be necessary
was a matter of facts and circumstances. The other, and more important
of the two cases, Crooker v. California,3 5 would also seem to be a "facts
and circumstances" decision. The majority of the Court, however, did
seem to indicate the time at which counsel might be necessary, agreeing
that to deprive counsel "for any part of the pretrial proceedings"36 might
mean denying due process. But they further stated that the deprivation
would have to be such as to make impossible a fair trial, and "the latter
determination necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the case."37
The Crooker case deserves mention here for still another statement of
the majority and the ensuing criticism of the dissenting Justice. The ma-
jority stated that petitioner Crooker's contention that any denial of a
request for counsel would be a denial of due process, no matter the cir-
cumstances involved, at the least "would effectively preclude police ques-
tioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was afforded opportunity
to call his attorney." 3 Referring to Betts v. Brady, it was concluded:
"Due process . . .demands no such rule. ' 39 Following this is a footnote
which anticipates one of the arguments of Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting
32 Ibid., at 344.
3 3 Crooker v. California, 357 (U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
34 357 U.S. 504 (1958). 37 Ibid., at 440 (emphasis supplied).
35 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 38 Ibid., at 441.
38 Ibid., at 439 (emphasis supplied). 39 Ibid., at 441.
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opinion in Crooker.40 The footnote says, in substance, that the opinion
of the majority does not extend Betts v. Brady (which held that a refusal
of the court to appoint counsel in a non-capital criminal case did not deny
due process) to a capital case, nor does it overrule Powell v. Alabama
and similar cases. The note continues: "[T]hose decisions involve another
problem, trial and conviction of the accused without counsel after state
refusal to appoint an attorney for him." 41 Yet in the light of previous
discussion, Powell does not just consider whether representation by counsel
at trial is necessary, but rather it decides that such representation is a
matter of right well before trial, specifically setting up "after arraignment"
as the gauge. Therefore, Douglas' criticism that "the rule of Betts v. Brady,
which never applied to a capital case . .. is now made to do so,' 42 and
his further observation that proceeding on the assumption "that Betts v.
Brady was properly decided, there is no basis in reason for extending it
to the denial of a request for counsel when the accused is arrested on a
capital charge," 43would seem well taken.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote one of the concurring opinions in
Spano, gave stronger expression to his beliefs concerning right to counsel
in his Crooker dissent, wherein he stated: "The demands of our civilization
expressed in the Due Process Clause require that the accused who wants a
counsel should have one at any time after the moment of arrest."" After
this declaration, Justice Douglas seems to be restraining himself in Spano;
he, in effect, says at the inception of the Spano opinion: "While everyone
will not agree with me that a suspect has the right to counsel, surely no
one will dispute that it is imperative for one who has been indicted."
CONCLUSION
In light of all that has been said up to this point, do the concurring
opinions in Spano v. People suggest a trend toward an increased right to
counsel in a criminal case? Powell v. Alabama held that a defendant is
entitled to counsel "after arraignment." Mr. Justice Douglas declared in
a dissenting opinion in Crooker v. California that the right should extend
to "after the moment of arrest." Justice Douglas' dissenting view, as modi-
fied to "after indictment," attained the stature of a concurring opinion
approved by two brother Justices in Spano v. People. The indication is
that we are advancing toward majority holdings that will require counsel
at each and every step in a criminal case.
40 Ibid, at 441, n.6.
41 Ibid., at 441, n. 6 (emphasis supplied). 43 Ibid., at 443.
42 Ibid, at 443. 44 Ibid., at 448 (emphasis supplied).
